ABSTRACT Although cyber-physical system (CPS) enhances the monitoring ability of power systems, it also raises the threats of cyber-attacks. False data injection attacks (FDIAs) can evade the bad data detection (BDD) module to inject pre-designed false data into a subset of measurements without being observed. To mitigate the threats, this paper develops a real-time FDIAs identification mechanism for AC state estimation (SE) based on dynamic-static parallel SE. When the system is compromised by FDIAs, the decrease of temporal correlation of the parallel SE time series can effectively reveal the potential FDIAs. To further capture these sequential uncorrelation features presented in the system states and enhance the detection accuracy, we also employ the cross wavelet transform (XWT) to execute the time-frequency domain decomposition and cross-examination with the parallel SE time series. Case studies on several IEEE standard test systems verify the validity of the proposed mechanism. In addition, we conduct sensitivity tests of two influence factors of the proposed mechanism and analyze in depth.
The deep integration of communication and information technology is driving the transformation of the power system into a typical CPS [1] , [2] . Although the CPS can achieve goals like optimal energy utilization, global situational awareness and improve quality of service, it also inevitably introduces cyber-security vulnerabilities related to communication networks and power intelligent devices, resulting in a significant increase in potential threats to the reliable and secure operation of smart grids [3] , [4] . As a fundamental data-support and real-time application in the EMS, accurate and credible SE plays a key role in the dynamic regulation of the power system, but at the same time, it also becomes the main target of malicious cyber-attacks. Recently, hackers can launch coordinated FDIAs against the vulnerabilities of residual-based BDD module to damage the SE by injecting the malicious data into a chosen set of measurements without being detected if they acquire the necessary information of the power system and have access to meters [5] . Since hackers can manipulate preconceived system measurements and estimated states, they can benefit from the attack behaviors according to their goals. As revealed in the previous references, FDIAs can compromise the programs of optimal power flow (OPF), automatic generation control (AGC), contingency analysis (CA) and other dispatch-aided decisions of the EMS [6] [7] [8] [9] . More seriously, hackers can modify real-time topology to mislead the control center, gain illegal profit from the confusing electricity market, and even cause the cascading failures [8] [9] [10] . These impacts accelerate the studies of the identification and prevention of FDIAs to become a research hotspot for CPS cyber-security in recent years.
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
To mitigate the risk, some defense studies focus on how to improve the physical robustness of the power system. For instance, optimal measurement data protection schemes have been developed in [11] [12] [13] . In [14] , Xu et al. proposed a protection strategy based on system physical parameters to detect FDIAs. In [15] , Wang et al. showed a defense strategy based on dynamic switching network topology to eliminate the risk of FDIAs.
Furthermore, past researches also investigated the effect of the changes of spatial data features of the system in the discrete time on identifying the FDIAs. In [16] , [17] , statistical methods are employed to detect FDIAs from abnormal system operations. FDIAs exposure technologies based on the deviations between system state predicted values and SE results are lucubrated in [18] , [19] . Dynamic SE based on Kalman filter (KF)-type filtering algorithms can facilitate the detection of outliers and gross errors [20] . Motivated by this, references [21] [22] [23] showed the FDIAs detection schemes based on KF-type filtering algorithms. In the aspect of artificial intelligence, machine learning [24] , [25] and deep learning [26] technologies are utilized to recognize the attack behavior characteristics of FDIAs based on offline training with a large number of historical data, then FDIAs can be detected online according to the spatial data features captured in real-time operations. Nevertheless, the FDIAs defense studies mentioned above are all based on the DC SE model.
To prevent the FDIAs against the AC SE (in this paper, such an attack called ''AC FDIAs''), Chaojun et al. in [27] developed a detection method for AC FDIAs using the Kullback-Leibler distance to compute the deviations between two probability distributions originated from measurement variations. In [28] , Yu et al. utilized the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) to reveal the spatial data features of system states, and then use the deep neural network to further capture the temporal correlations of the normal operating conditions and the compromised events, which develops the FDIAs detection online. VOLUME 7, 2019 C. LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS However, the defensive resources and computational complexity required by physical protection methods will undoubtedly increase the operating costs of the power system. Moreover, most existing works are based on DC SE. By contrast, the AC FDIAs are more consistent with the actual power systems and have higher concealment [29] , which may develop an ordeal to those researches devoted to DC attack patterns. Few studies have been discussed on the prevention of AC FDIAs, especially aimed at the recent attack scenarios, as revealed in [30] [31] [32] . Researches [27] , [28] provided solutions for detecting AC FDIAs. Despite this, both methods also cause false negative detections for FDIAs on strongstrength attacks (without losing generality, the ''strength'' of attacks in terms of the degree of system states deviations result from the attack vector, i.e., the strong-strength attack means the attack causes large deviations to the objective state variables). In fact, we should first pay attention to strong-strength attacks that can lead to a significant influence on power systems and more likely result in power outages and blackouts. In summary, we can note that the previous protection strategies may have the following drawbacks: (1) Increase the operating costs of power systems. (2) AC attack patterns are not considered for testing the detection performance of past studies, which can perform more stealthy and threatening attack behaviors. (3) The priority of the detection of strong-strength attacks is not emphasized. To address these problems, this paper develops a real-time FDIAs identification mechanism, which not only focuses on the static-spatial data relationship of system states in the discrete time but also derives from the dynamic-continuous correlation features contained in the consecutive system states. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
(1) Considering that dynamic system states are full of implicated temporal correlations, we propose a dynamicstatic parallel SE based mechanism to availably emerge the deviations between consecutive and discrete system states under the compromised conditions. Also, benefits from the time-frequency domain analysis and noise immunity ability of XWT, we adopt the wavelet cross spectrum (WCS) and wavelet coherence (WCOH) to implicitly reveal the temporal uncorrelation of parallel SE time series that can alleviate the impact of measurement and estimation errors on the detection effect of FDIAs.
(2) Different from the existing studies for mitigating FDIAs threats, which would increase defense budget or require a lot of samples for training, the proposed mechanism not only can real-time response to identifying the FDIAs that make a certain impact on the system but also needs no additional investment.
(3) We assess the proposed mechanism with the AC FDIAs cases originated from the current research [30] . The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism develops a satisfactory true positive rate (TPR) of FIDAs identification and outperforms the previous methods. (4) Sensitivity analysis is implemented to evaluate the performance bottlenecks of the proposed mechanism and offer the ameliorative directions for future work.
D. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly introduce the FDIAs threats in the power CPS and the principle of FDIAs against the vulnerabilities of AC SE. Section III amply illustrates the composing and execution process of the proposed mechanism. Simulation results and performance analysis of the proposed mechanism on several IEEE standard test systems are detailed in Section IV. Section V provides conclusions and summarizes our work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. FDIAs THREATS
Due to the complexity and fragility of the information transmission process in power CPS, hackers may make great efforts to tamper with sensor measurements, inject false control commands and topology parameters, delay or replay sensor observations, and perform other malicious actions. As shown in Fig. 1 , the processes of acquisition, transmission and integrated analysis of measurements are threatened by the stealthy FDIAs currently recognized as one of the most serious threats to power CPS.
According to different attack routes, we can distinguish the attack scenarios of FDIAs in the following way: (1) Temper with the readings of sensors, e.g., phasor measurement units (PMU), remote terminal units (RTU) and various intelligent user meters. (2) Directly invade the communication networks.
(3) Maliciously penetrate the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and primary domain controller (PDC). The ultimate goal is to break the integrity and authenticity of measurements, which are employed to offer precise and adequate observations of operational constraints for state estimators to infer the real-time operating states of the system in quantities and subsequently assist the decisionmaking of the control center. Due to a pre-designed subset of measurements is compromised, hackers can contaminate the SE results to mislead the operators that may result in decision mistakes, and even touch off the overload and blackout issues of the power system [10] . Hence, it is paramount to understand the attack mode of AC FDIAs that can give opportunities to power CPS to improve the reliability and economy of operation by formulating appropriate countermeasures.
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF AC FDIAs
Hackers launch FDIAs by injecting false data called attack vector a into the natural measurement vector z=[z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z m ] T to disrupt the AC SE in (1), where z generally contains voltage magnitudes and phase angles, complex power injections at buses (i.e., load) and complex power flows on branches (including forward and reverse directions). x=[x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ] T is the state vector, which composed of voltage magnitudes and phase angles. h(·) represents the nonlinear measurement function between state vector x and measurement vector z, which depends on the network topology and physical parameters of the system. Measurement error vector e=[e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e m ] T is subject to the Gaussian white noise distribution with a covariance R. In practice, weighted least square (WLS) method is a traditional approach for solving static AC SE [29] .
In view of communication failure or electromagnetic interference, bad data often exists in measurements that can lead to significant errors in estimating the system states. Hence, the BDD module of the EMS is employed to detect them, which mostly based on the largest normalized residual (LNR) method. Assuming that the change vector of corresponding state vector x is defined as c, and the measurement residuals of the system before and after the attack is r and r a , respectively. Generally, the natural measurements z can pass the LNR-based BDD module, which calculates the l 2 -norm of the measurement residuals to detect bad measurements as follows:
where γ is the detection threshold of LNR-based BDD module. When the measurement vector z is injected malicious false data by hackers, the impact of FDIAs on BDD module can be described as:
where z a is the compromised measurement vector. To circumvent the BDD module to remain stealthy, when hackers are familiar with system topology and have access to measurements, the attack vector should be constructed as follows:
Note that, in such case, the LNR value is unchanged after attack, i.e., ||r a || = ||r|| ≤ γ .
Different from the ideal conditions, it is far more unlikely for a hacker to obtain the complete knowledge of the system in practice. To consider this limitation, we achieve a sufficient number of practical AC attack samples based on the attack model introduced in [30] , which only require a few prerequisite measurements in the attacking region associated with boundary buses.
III. PROPOSED FDIAs IDENTIFICATION MECHANISM
Since the constructed false data attack vector a satisfies the underlying Kirchhoff's circuit laws, it can evade the residualbased BDD and cause the system states deviated from normal events. However, we would like to clarify that there is a temporal dependency between dynamic system states, which makes it necessary for hackers to monitor the system for a prolonged period of time and to consecutively tamper with all the affected measurements to generate the undetectable FDIAs concerning temporal correlation. Such a complex type of attack is impractical to launch in the real power utilities [23] . Inspired by this, instead of the off-line training and disperse recognition of attack behaviors in the previous studies, in this section, we introduce a real-time FDIAs identification mechanism to reveal the potential attacks by capturing the changes of the temporal correlation features among the system states. Fig. 2 shows the basic framework of the proposed FDIAs realtime identification mechanism. Our proposed mechanism mainly consists of the dynamic-static parallel state estimators and the XWT-based dynamic feature extractor. In this mechanism, the parallel state estimators are composed of WLS-based static state estimator and mixed Kalman particle filter (MKPF)-based dynamic state estimator. The XWT-based dynamic feature extractor can effectively distill the temporal correlation features of the parallel SE time series and reveal the inconsistency results rooted from the FDIAs against the system. According to the system measurements z k and the measurement function h(·) at instant k, the parallel temporal sequence signals of state variables output by the dynamicstatic parallel state estimators should present a high temporal cross-correlation under the normal operating conditions (after cleaning data via BDD module). When the system suffers significant FDIAs, the WLS-based SE values will jump to the desired direction of hackers corresponding to the purposely changed measurements. On the other hand, the dynamic SE values acquired from nonlinear filtering algorithm will shrink to the false values gradually in a certain period of time due to the constraint effects of dynamic transition function and small process noise. Hence, the proposed mechanism can successfully identify FDIAs by real-time monitoring and analyzing the temporal correlation features of the parallel SE time series during this period of time.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISM
Using the KF-type filtering algorithms to detect FDIAs have been developed in [21] [22] [23] . However, due to the limited dynamic estimation performance of the filtering algorithms used in the related researches, large linearization errors will be generated. Further studies are essential on the detection effect of these schemes under the AC attack patterns. What's more, the numerical indexes evaluating the estimated deviations exploited in the previous detection schemes would unreservedly count the estimated errors and measurement errors, which result in the decrease of the detection efficiency. To avoid this, MKPF-based dynamic SE algorithm, which is utilized in the proposed mechanism has strong state tracking ability and numerical stability to mitigate the influence of estimated errors. Furthermore, XWT takes advantage of the multi-scale wavelet to analyze the temporal correlation features of parallel SE time series, effectively immune to the impact of random measurement errors, so as to achieve realtime identification of FDIAs that causes the correlation of parallel SE time series to descend below the predetermined detection threshold.
B. MKPF-BASED DYNAMIC STATE ESTIMATOR
Particle filter (PF), based on Bayesian estimation theory, is a recursive algorithm for estimating dynamic states. It approximates the posterior probability density function (PDF) of state variables by a cluster of random particles and their associated weights, which therefore provides a novel idea for overcoming the filtering aporia of non-Gaussian and nonlinear noise.
However, the PF algorithm is faced with the problem of particle degeneracy, that is, with the progress of iteration, the majority of particle weights tend to be zero. It will lead to a decrease of particle diversity and the collapse of particles to a set of discrete trajectories and ultimately result in filtering failure. Aim at solving this problem, particle resampling technologies and improved particle proposal distributions are crucially introduced in the PF [33] [34] [35] . MKPF is a more promising algorithm to solve the valid particles scarcity issue by fusing the unscented Kalman filter (UKF) and extended Kalman filter (EKF) to supply the precise particle proposal distribution while combining the latest measurements in the iteration process.
The core idea of the MKPF can be divided into three steps: 1) transfer and update M particles with the UKF at instant k, and obtain the UKF estimations of each particle.
2) takex
), the acquired particles are closer to the real posterior distribution to implement the PF process to create the accurate estimated results of system states. The details are described as follows:
Step1: Unscented Transform and UKF Process To avoid the nonlocal effects and high order errors in generating sigma points, a proportional modified sampling strategy [36] is adopted in this paper:
where x k−1 is the estimation of state vector x at instant k-1. P k−1 is the covariance matrix of state variables at instant k-1. Parameter λ = α 2 (n + κ)-n is a scale factor, which is used to reduce the total prediction errors. Parameter α is a proportional correction factor that devoted to controlling the spread of sigma points and usually in the range of [0.0001,1]. Parameter κ is used to ensure the matrix (n + λ)P k keep positive semidefinite.
[·] i represents the ith column of a matrix. The weights associated with the ith sigma point, which are used to calculate the predicted state vector and covariance matrix can be defined as follows:
where the parameter β usually takes 2 as the optimum. When the state vector x k−1 and covariance matrix P k−1 at instant k-1 are obtained, we can construct a set of sigma points {χ i k−1 } based on the selected sampling strategy and calculate the one-step prediction values of the state vector and covariance matrix:
where f (·) represents the dynamic transfer function of the system. q k−1 is the process noise vector at instant k-1, whose covariance matrix is Q k−1 .
Considering the time continuity of the system dynamics, in this paper, auto regression moving average (ARMA) model with proper order is employed to represent the dynamic transfer model of the system [37] . Besides, due to the dynamic process of the system is full of fluctuation, it is not reasonable to consider the system process noise q k and Q k as constants. To overcome this shortcoming, the noise estimator based on the Sage-Husa maximum posterior is applied to execute the adaptive adjustment to q k and Q k after each state prediction step, see [38] for details.
Then, reconstruct a new set of sigma points {ζ i k−1 } and calculate the one-step prediction values of measurements according to thex UKF k|k−1 andP UKF k|k−1 obtained from (7)- (9):
Calculate the UKF Kalman gain matrix K UKF k and update the estimations of the UKF state vectorx UKF k and covariancê P UKF k based on the predicted results above.
Step2: EKF Process Take the UKF estimationsx
as the EKF estimations at instant k-1, and perform the EKF process to filter and update the particle values.
where F k and G k , H k and U k are the Jacobian matrices of the system dynamic transfer model and measurement model, respectively. Then, we can attain the proposal distri-
EKF k ) for each particle originated from the EKF estimations.
Step3: PF Process The set of particles {x
is generated by sampling from the proposal distribution N (x EKF k,j ,P EKF k,j ) of each particle, and then implement the PF process to estimate the final state vector and covariance matrix.
Before outputting the estimated results, the particle resampling judgment is crucial. Calculate the effective particles as follows: (25) If the M eff is below the set resampling threshold M t (generally 2/3M ), it indicates that the particle weights have been seriously degraded. It is necessary to conduct the residual resampling [34] on the particles to eliminate the particles with a small weight and replicate the particles with a large weight; otherwise, output the estimated results:
The diversity and effectiveness of particles determine the accuracy and uncertainty representation ability of the PF algorithm. According to the above procedure, as shown in Fig.3 , we take advantage of the improved PF proposal distribution and introduce the particle resampling strategy in the filtering process. In such cases, we can effectively enhance the filtering performance of the PF algorithm to realize the strong tracking dynamic SE of power systems based on MKPF.
C. XWT-BASED DYNAMIC FEATURE EXTRACTOR
XWT and wavelet correlation analysis are based on the continuous wavelet transform (CWT). The essence of CWT is to obtain a holonomic time-scale representation of local and transient phenomena occurring at different time scales [39] . It can decompose the time series into signals in the timefrequency domain by convolving time series with the scaling dilation and translation of the counterpart of a selected mother wavelet function. For time series x(t), its CWT can be defined as follows:
where ψ(t) is a mother wavelet function. Parameter s can be interpreted as a scaling factor of ψ(t). Parameter τ is used to control the temporal translation or shift of ψ(t). * represents the complex conjugate. Morlet wavelet [40] provides an outstanding balance between the time-frequency domain in terms of localization, so this paper selects it as the mother wavelet function, which is expressed as:
where ω 0 represents a dimensionless frequency, which has respect to the balance between frequency and position in localization, and t represents a dimensionless time.
XWT is widely applied to study the interrelation between two signals [41] , [42] , which can extract the area of common higher power and relative phase in the hidden time-frequency domain. By analogy with Fourier analysis, the XWT of two time series x(t) and y(t) can be expressed as follows:
In the practical analysis, WCS and WCOH are usually employed to measure the ''coherence intensity'' in the timefrequency domain of time series, which are respectively defined as follows:
where S(·) is a smoothing operator in both time and scale directions to develop meaningful cross-coherence. WCS C xy (s,.τ ) provides a complex time-frequency matrix to reflect the power correlation region and reveal when there is a higher or lower common power between two signals. WCOH R 2 xy (s, τ ) ranges in [0,1] and can be conceptualized as a normalized numerical form that emphasizes the local correlation between x(t) and y(t) within the time-frequency domain.
D. PROCEDURE OF REAL-TIME FDIAs IDENTIFICATION
According to the above introduction of the proposed mechanism, the AC FDIAs identification can be converted to a coherence anomaly detection problem. Fig.4 shows the procedure of real-time FDIAs identification, which includes the following steps. First, output the parallel SE time series from the dynamic-static parallel state estimator based on the realtime readings of sensors. Then, the CWT process is employed to implement the temporal-spatial decomposition of the parallel signals in the Fourier space. During the dynamic system process, the time-scale window is sliding to execute the crossexamination of the temporal correlation of parallel signals by WCS and WCOH. Besides, the modulus of common complex power and magnitude-squared coherence of multiscale wavelet are used to measure the cross-coherence of the parallel signals. Since the proposed mechanism relies on the estimated system dynamic states, the tradeoffs between TPR and false positive rate (FPR) need to be considered with the setting of detection threshold, which directly affects the effectiveness and sensitivity of the proposed mechanism. To facilitate the analysis of identification performance bottlenecks caused by different technical levels, the detection thresholds applied in this paper are set for each bus to ensure that no false positive detection occurs during normal operations according to the investigation of historical circumstances.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we use comprehensive tests on the IEEE 30-bus test system (topology and measurement configuration are shown in Fig.5 ) to illustrate the superiority of our mechanism and compare it with the previous studies. Besides, simulations on the IEEE 57-and 118-bus systems are implemented to verify the extensibility and effectiveness of our mechanism. Finally, we also study the sensitivities of dynamic SE algorithm and sampling interval on the recognition success rate, and intuitively analyze the limitation and improvement strategy of the proposed mechanism.
The load profiles applied in our simulations are acquired from a real district of China. Then, MATPOWER 6.0 toolbox is employed to run the AC power flow program to obtain the branch complex powers added corresponding measurement error. Generating 10,000 attack cases using the AC FDIAs construction approach under the condition of partial network information. The attack content of each case is randomly generated in the following range: voltage magnitude (−0.05p.u.∼+0.05p.u.), voltage phase angle (−0.1rad ∼+0.1rad), bus power injection (−50%∼+50%) and branch power flows (−50%∼+50%). In each event, the measurement sampling interval is set to 3 min according to general measurement techniques. All simulations are conducted with MATLAB R2018b on a PC with an Intel Core i5-8500 CPU, an NVIDIA RTX 2080 GPU and 16 GB RAM. 
A. ANALYSIS OF FDIAs IDENTIFICATION PROCESS
For simplicity and without loss of generality, the identification process of the proposed mechanism is illustrated by selecting a typical attack case against the voltage magnitude at bus 30 of the IEEE 30-bus test system. As shown in Fig.6 , this attack caused the voltage magnitude at bus 30 to rise by 0.05p.u. at the sampling moment 151, and the estimated results of dynamic-static parallel SE were obviously biased.
It can be observed that under the normal operating conditions during the sampling moment 1∼150, the MKPF-based estimations followed the WLS-based estimations, which contributed the two voltage magnitude signal curves to be highly close and the localized fluctuations were identical, too. In light of this, the parallel SE time series should be extremely correlated without attacks. Then, the FDIAs launched at sampling moment 151 whose strength was 0.05p.u. made the WLS-based estimations surge to the target values immediately, but in contrast, the MKPF-based estimations gradually converged to the target values. It took more than 30 sampling intervals to restore the mutative characteristics to be consistent with the WLS-based estimations. Thus, by detecting the temporal correlation anomalies between the parallel voltage magnitude signals in the initial stage of the attack, the stealthy FDIAs can be identified, which cannot be observed by the LNR-based BDD.
Application of CWT to the parallel voltage magnitude signals, and then construct the cross-examination with the two decompositions (WCS and WCOH) to reveal the local similarities in time-frequency scale and divulge the various characteristic information of the two signals. The results of the cross-examination of the parallel time series over XWT are shown in Fig.7 . Fig.7 (a) depicts the WCS of the two signals, where the y-axis represents the wavelet scale (which has been converted to the equivalent Fourier period). Color scale represents the cross-coherence of common complex power with the deeper color illustrates smaller coherence, which indicates that FDIAs may occur locally. The blue dotted line represents the cone of influence (COI) where edge effects should be considered outside. WCS indicates that the cross-correlation of the two signals decreased within the initial stage of FDIAs, meanwhile, points out the abate of common complex power in the corresponding area. Fig.7(b) shows the WCOH of the parallel voltage magnitude signals with 73 wavelet scales (73 is the optimum choice after verification). The z-axis represents the magnitudesquared coherence of the two signals. The blue plane is the WCOH detection threshold plane of bus 30 applied in our simulations. In this simulation, it can be observed that the WCOH of multiple scales reduced below the detection threshold after suffering FDIAs, indicating that the proposed mechanism was successful in identifying the attack with the translated numerical form, and the minimum appeared at the beginning of the attack.
B. ANALYSIS OF FDIAs IDENTIFICATION PERFORMANCE
To analyze the performance of the proposed mechanism and completely compare it with the existing detection schemes based on KF-type filtering algorithms, we apply the same attack samples to these methods introduced in [21] , [22] and [23] . For simplicity, take the state vector of bus 30 of the IEEE 30-bus system as the study object. Fig.8 shows the change of TPR of each mechanism with different attack strengths.
From Fig.8 , it can be concluded that the proposed mechanism can remarkably outperform the existing methods and provides higher detection accuracy, especially faced with weak-strength attacks (attacks that cause little deviations), e.g., attack strengths are 0.004 p.u. and 0.005 rad. One crucial reason accounts for this. The voltage drops are assumed to be neglected in the DC system model, but in the real world, there are voltage deviations over the transmission line due to line loss. Hence, KF as a linear filtering algorithm is generally inconsistent with the actual power system, which with more truncation errors to be taken into account. Although the UKF algorithm used in [23] is an outstanding nonlinear filtering algorithm, its high demand for the precise knowledge of the process noise matrix restricts its filtering effect in the power system. On the other hand, different from the past schemes that exploit numerical indices to calculate the estimation deviations between filtering results and estimated values, the proposed mechanism captures the temporal correlation features of the parallel SE time series by implementing the XWT on the state vector time series, which significantly reduces the impact of estimation errors and measurement errors. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism still has an excellent effect on identifying weak-strength attacks (especially the attacks on the voltage phase angle). This is mainly due to the fact that, in this simulation, the voltage phase angle fluctuates more between sampling intervals in the normal operating conditions, i.e., it is more likely that the previous schemes fail to detect the weak-strength attacks on voltage phase angle while involves no false positive detection due to an indispensable higher detection threshold. To improve this, the proposed mechanism rises from the numerical analysis level to the signal analysis level, and the threshold setting only needs to focus on the time-continuous correlation between the signals.
Besides the above common accuracy analysis, we are also interested in evaluating the scalability of the proposed mechanism with different scale systems subject to AC FDIAs. For effective comparison, we use the same attack strategy and load profiles (scaled down to match the load levels of the test systems) in the IEEE 57-and 118-bus systems. The statistical identification TPR of attacks with four strength ranges are depicted in Fig.9 . From Fig.9 , it can be concluded that under the conditions of similar measurement noise, load fluctuation, and load distribution, the performance of the proposed mechanism in different scale systems is nearly equivalent. One important reason is that the identification process is related to the temporal correlation features of the parallel SE time series rather than the network parameters of the system. Hence, the proposed mechanism can develop a good generalization ability in different scale systems. Furthermore, we also recorded the time it took to identify each attack (including the time cost by the dynamic SE process and the XWT analysis process) and the statistics of the average time with different systems and particle numbers M are shown in Table 1 . It is obvious that the required time for identifying an attack is delayed when the system scale gets larger, as there are more measurement constraints for dynamic SE in more complex grids. Also, the time expense increases slightly as the number of particles grows. These issues can be solved by distributed estimation in future work. But it needs to be clarified that the identification time is still much less than the commercial SE periodically triggered intervals, which generally at periods of 1∼5 mins [23] . Therefore, our mechanism has a high identification time resolution, which contributes to the real-time response to the AC FDIAs and the application in actual power utilities.
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The sensitivity of the proposed mechanism mainly depends on three factors: anomaly detection threshold, estimation VOLUME 7, 2019 performance of the filtering algorithm and the measurement sampling interval . In this section, we focus on studying the latter two factors by testing the proposed mechanism with different factor properties on the IEEE 30-bus system while the detection threshold is set to prevent false positive detection in normal operating conditions. Firstly, we replace MKPF algorithm with EKF and UKF to construct three FDIAs identifiers with different nonlinear filtering algorithms. The overall dynamic SE performance of three filtering algorithms are illustrated with the indices of the relative error of voltage magnitudes and the absolute error of voltage phase angles, which are defined as follows:
where N bus is the number of test system nodes. k is the current sampling moment, and the superscript e and t represent the estimated and true value of state variables, respectively. Table 2 summarizes the indices calculated results of the three filtering algorithms according to the undamaged measurements of the test system, and it is clear that the MKPF algorithm has higher estimation accuracy and numerical stability. Fig.10 shows how the three identifiers perform at V 30 for the same attack scenarios. By comparison, it can be concluded that the identification mechanism with MKPF algorithm has better detection effect. Since more estimated deviations will be generated, the detection effect of the EKF-based identifier on AC FDIAs is significantly restricted, in particular, faced with weak-strength attacks. Only when the attack strength is close to 0.09p.u. can the TPR of the EKF-based identifier exceed 90%. Compared with the EKF-based identifier, the detection performance of the UKF-based identifier is greatly improved due to its strong nonlinear filtering and expression ability. However, due to the high requirement for the accuracy of the system dynamic model, the UKF algorithm still has a limitation on the dynamic SE of nonlinear and non-Gaussian systems. Without this disadvantage, the MKPF outstrips the UKF in terms of accurately tracking the dynamic temporal-spatial transfer characteristic of system states and remains better generalization stability. Hence, the MKPF-based identifier has less influence on the analysis effect of XWT, so that the proposed mechanism can pay more attention to the temporal correlation features of parallel SE time series and less attention to the impact of estimation errors, which guarantees a more satisfactory TPR.
In addition, a comparison is implemented to observe how the proposed mechanism performs with the sampling interval varies. We assume that is 3 min in previous simulations. In fact, the current power systems are progressively introducing the PMU based on the existing SCADA system, which may cause the diversity of the measurement information collection technologies of power systems in different regions. Thus, is selected from {1, 3, 5} min to test the sensitivity of on the proposed mechanism. Simulation results are shown in Fig.11 , and the display contents are still based on the V 30 .
By comparing the identification TPR of the proposed mechanism under different , we can notice that with the shortening of , the TPR of the detection results is significantly improved, especially the detection effect on weakstrength attacks. When the attack strength is 0.0075p.u., the TPR of the identification mechanism with three are 98.3%, 94.3%, and 87.2%, respectively, and little difference between them. However, in the cases of weak-strength attacks, e.g., 0.004p.u., TPR are 81.9%, 46.9%, and 11.3%, respectively.
From the sensitivity results, we can learn that the shorter the is, the greater detection effect we will achieve. Meanwhile, around weak-strength attacks for V 30 , the variation of TPR with is particularly noticeable. The reason for the results is that under the higher sampling frequency, the collected measurement information has stronger dynamic continuity, and the system variables estimated by the filtering algorithms fluctuate less between , which can be easier to reflect the dynamic transfer characteristics of the system and better preserve the high temporal correlation with static SE. Especially, it is more beneficial for XWT to capture the time-continuous correlation features of the system states in transient and dynamic operations. The system states at longer simply show the discrete quasi-steady approximations of the system dynamics. Note that with the wide installation of PMU in power systems and the rapid development of new measurement technologies, the proposed mechanism will display more preeminent identification performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the risk of the stealthy FDIAs that can compromise the system states and cause trigger cascading accidents are addressed by a dynamic-static parallel SE based realtime identification mechanism. In general, FDIAs cannot satisfy the high-dimensional continuous correlation of system states in time, which actually provides key information for the FDIAs identification. Inspired by this, we carry out the dynamic-static parallel SE to divulge the dynamic correlation feature anomalies caused by attacks to expose the potential FDIAs.
To improve the identification performance, the proposed mechanism replaces the PF algorithm with the MKPF algorithm by optimizing the proposal distribution of particles, thus realizing the strong tracking of system states. For astute synergy, XWT is introduced to effectively capture the timefrequency domain dynamic correlation features of parallel SE, which can develop the precise verdict of FDIAs identification.
The simulation analyses on the IEEE standard systems validate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism and illustrate that it performs more robust performance than the existing FDIAs detection schemes. In addition, we conduct a sensitivity test on two factors. The results reveal two important aspects to enhance the detection effect of the proposed mechanism. On the one hand, the amelioration of dynamic SE algorithm can mitigate the impact of estimation errors. On the other hand, by promoting the access of intelligence measurement devices such as PMU and shortening the sampling interval of measurements, the proposed mechanism can develop a more satisfactory identification TPR of FDIAs.
